Sunday, October 30, 2022

Presidential Twitter Library Virtual Tour - Mahnoor (Non-Core Post)

This week’s reading reminded me of an interesting cultural artifact from the Trump years: Trevor Noah and The Daily Show's “Donald J. Trump Presidential Twitter Library.” The “library” consisted of both a published volume and a series of brick-and-mortar pop-up galleries in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York City. I’ve linked the site on which you can take a virtual tour of the LA pop-up and have also attached a few screenshots from my own digital wanderings in the virtual gallery space. 

What strikes me about this project is that it transcribed internet discourse into spaces of more traditional forms of cultural discourse i.e. libraries, museums, books. During the Trump presidency, it became rather common for formal stances taken by the executive branch to be announced on Twitter before being spoken at the podium of the press secretary. Trump often traversed and confused boundaries between informal and formal, real and unreal, official proclamation and off-hand remark. Though the library is a work of satire, it speaks to the genuine frustration caused by Trump’s unwieldy and prolific tweeting at the time. It also had the potential to offer a kind of salve. The curation and containment of the tweets made them manageable and discrete objects, as opposed to drops indistinguishable from one another in the daily deluge of always inane and often disconcerting Trump tweets. Of course, now that the pop-up exhibits have been dismantled in "real" life and live on in virtual form, the selected tweets, though curated and organized, have returned to the realm of the digital.


https://www.cc.com/info/s0zbw0/trump-twitter-library-los-angeles









Friday, October 28, 2022

Core Post #5 (Sebastian)

    Rather than focusing on the January 6th insurrection and its context, I would like to consider how Joan Donovan, Emily Dreyfuss, and Brian Friedberg define a “meme” in Meme Wars: The Untold Stories of the Online Battles Upending Democracy in America and what some of the potential implications of that definition are. In the “Introduction,” they discuss a video of “Elizabeth from Knoxville” as a prime example of a meme, explaining that it was “a memorable piece of media that resonated with people for different reasons. The video clip of her was recontextualized, remixed, and redistributed, carrying all sorts of meanings” (Donovan et al. 2). Throughout the book, the authors maintain this relatively capacious definition. They note, for instance, that a phrase often associated with the events of January 6th – “Stop the steal” – was itself memetic (Donovan et al. 4). In short, their definition does not require that a meme have a single identifiable form to be considered a meme; it can be an image, video, slogan, or idea as long as it is widely circulated on the internet and “recontextualized, remixed, and redistributed” in the process.

    While I appreciate the openness of this definition, I cannot help but wonder if it is overly capacious and perhaps in tension with the authors’ attempts to situate memes and their impact as a new phenomenon. They write, “On January 6, pundits and people across America and the globe were shocked by what they saw…. We were not shocked. For those who had been watching these [meme] communities… the events of that day were entirely foreseeable” (Donovan et al. 9). Through this statement, they position memes as something so new and unique within American political culture that most professional commentators were entirely unprepared to account for them in a meaningful way. I do not doubt that there is some truth to these claims. But, as someone whose work is primarily informed by Indigenous studies, I am always wary of such gestures to “newness” and “uniqueness.” As scholars like Kyle Whyte (Potawatomi) point out, settler-colonialism constantly uses the specter of “unprecedented” and “urgent” crises as a way to ignore Indigenous epistemologies and justify further violence to Indigenous communities (55). For example, the framework of “the Anthropocene” envisions contemporary climate change and environmental degradation as relatively recent crises, ignoring that they are – to quote Max Liboiron (Red River Métis/Michif) – “an enactment of ongoing colonial relations to Land” (6). The context and stakes for memes are obviously quite different, but I still think it is worth questioning the temporal narrative implied by Donovan, Dreyfuss, and Friedberg. 

    To illustrate this point, I would like to turn to two examples from Indigenous meme culture. In “Decolonativization,” the sixth episode in the second season of Reservation Dogs, the protagonists attend a “Native American Reclamation and Decolonization Symposium Youth Summit” on their reservation. The summit is led by MissMa8riarch and Augusto Firekeeper, both of whom are clearly meant to be parodies of online influencers. When introducing herself, MissMa8riarch offers a land acknowledgement. It begins in a standard fashion, mentioning that the summit is taking place on the traditional homelands of the Caddo, the Osage, and the Muscogee. But then MissMa8riarch announces, “Before them were our Neanderthal relatives, so acknowledge them. And before that, even, the Dinosaur Nation. Dinosaur Oyate, you know? Before that, the Star People. Also our reptilian relatives above and below earth.” Following this speech, MissMa8riarch and Firekeeper ask the protagonist to engage in a variety of inane trust-building activities that they describe as doing the work of “decolonization.” At the end of the episode, one of the protagonists, Cheese, asks the two influencers what they mean by “decolonization.” Unsatisfied by their very literal response, he clarifies, “I know the definition. What I was asking is how are the things we did today supposed to do anything?” 

    These two scenes – MissMa8riarch’s land acknowledgement and Cheese’s question about decolonization – critique the process of meme-ification and yet became memes in their own right. Cheese’s question implicitly references “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor” by Eve Tuck (Unangax̂) and K.Wayne Yang where the authors disavow “the ease with which the language of decolonization has been superficially adopted into education and other social sciences” (2). They argue that decolonization is only decolonization when it involves “the repatriation of Indigenous land and life” (Tuck and Yang 1). Thus, Reservation Dogs points out that “decolonization” as a term has itself become a meme emptied of its original specificity by the likes of MissMa8riarch and Firekeeper. Much the same can be said for the concept of land acknowledgements, which the episode suggests have also become something of a meme. The intent behind land acknowledgements – to draw attention to the continued survivance of Indigenous communities and the non-inevitability of the settler-colonial project – has been lost because white liberals appropriated it as a “settler move to innocence” (Tuck and Yang 9). MissMa8riarch’s humorous attempts to thank “Dinosaur Nation” – which does nothing to address settler-colonialism – became an immediate inspiration for online memes. One such meme, posted to Instagram by “@ndn.memer,” features the cast of The Land Before Time beneath a text box that reads: “How the spirits of our ancient relatives look as we acknowledge the land is traditional dinosaur territory” (see below).

    If one were to focus exclusively on the way that concepts like decolonization and land acknowledgements have become memes, detached from their original meaning and purpose by the aforementioned machinations of white liberals, one might concur with the assessment in Meme Wars that memes are both new and potentially quite damaging to contemporary political discourse. But – as the Land Before Time meme demonstrates – memes can also be a way to call out and correct these problems. This suggests that memes might not be the problem – or, at least, not exclusively the problem – but are instead the site where the problem (and occasionally its redress) occurs. In “‘Since Time Im-MEME-morial’!: Indigenous Meme Networks and Fan-Activism,” Jacqueline Land observes, “Indigenous meme artists lay claim to meme-making as Indigenous practice tied to traditional culture and decolonial action and use the form to map Indigenous presence within digital platforms” (184). Rather than understanding memes as a purely unique or novel form, it might be more generative to think of them as the current conduit for much older social formations and relational practices. Indeed, the use of memes here is a clear manifestation of Indigenous survivance, which Gerald Vizenor (Anishinaabe) defines as “an active sense of presence over absence, deracination, and oblivion; survivance is the continuance of stories, not a mere reaction, however pertinent” (1). 

    As a further illustration of this point, I would also like to consider a meme posted “@nsrgnts” featuring a shot of five Indigenous characters from Disney’s Peter Pan sitting in front of drums (see below). Speech bubbles have been added above the characters, creating a joke about dating a woman from a different tribal nation that most certainly was not in the original film. The use of Peter Pan is noteworthy because the Indigenous characters in the film are now widely regarded as among the most racist caricatures to appear in any piece of Disney media (a crowded field, to be sure). The meme subversively reimagines these characters but contrasting the stereotyping assumption that inform their appearance in the film with what they might realistically say while talking to each other. Once again, this subversion is neither novel nor unique to the meme format. In Reservation Reelism: Redfacing, Visual Sovereignty, and Representations of Native Americans in Film, Michelle H. Raheja (Seneca) notes that Indigenous actors working in the early decades of the American film industry were asked to play highly stereotypical roles. But they often undermined these stereotypes by saying curse words or talking casually amongst themselves about unrelated topics when asked by white filmmakers to speak in their respective Indigenous languages onscreen. Raheja argues that these actors “appropriated the narrative and visual conventions of the film medium stereotypes of themselves for their own interests and to their own ends and… strived to display tribally specific knowledge” (30). The Peter Pan meme might be understood as a reworked manifestation of this tradition. To be sure, the meme provides a new format for expression, but the expression itself is not new. 

    I remain somewhat suspicious of any narrative that frames memes as a novel and determinant force in sociocultural and political spheres (memes, for instance, did not create the white supremacist and patriarchal ideologies that Donald Trump mobilized during his presidential run and eventual presidential tenure), but I also do not want to deny the significance of memes entirely or suggest that they do not bear further scrutiny. To effectively interrogate memes, though, I suspect that one might need to actively consider the different forms that they take, which is precisely what Donovan, Dreyfuss, and Friedberg largely avoid in their initial definition. As previously noted, I appreciate the capaciousness of their definition, but I also wonder if that quality makes it difficult to discern the characteristics of memes that are genuinely unique. Per this definition, the word “decolonization” and the Peter Pan joke can both be understood as memes that function as conduits for a broader and, frankly, much older set of discourses and practices. But their forms are very different – the former is a term that primarily circulates in academic and activist spaces, while the latter is a combination of image and text shared and circulated on Instagram. To avoid reproducing settler moves to “unprecedented” and “urgent” crises, I think it is important to fully situate these “memes” in their historical and cultural contexts. But I also think it can still be extremely generative to consider their distinct formal characteristics and how those characteristics might shape the role they play in these ongoing discourses and practices (for instance, digging into the specifics of how a word like “decolonization” became meme-ified versus why the text and image format associated with social media has become an especially vibrant site for reappropriating older racist caricatures). 

Additional Citations:

Land, Jacqueline. “‘Since Time Im-MEME-morial’!: Indigenous Meme Networks and Fan

Activism.” Journal of Cinema and Media Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, 2021, pp. 181-186. 

Liboiron, Max. Pollution is Colonialism. Duke University Press, 2021.

Raheja, Michelle H. Reservation Reelism: Redfacing, Visual Sovereignty, and Representations of

Native Americans in Film. University of Nebraska Press, 2010. 

Tuck, Eve, and K. Wayne Yang. “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor.” Decolonization:

Indigeneity, Education, and Society, vol. 1, no. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40. 

Vizenor, Gerald. “Aesthetics of Survivance: Literary Theory and Practice.” Survivance:

Narratives of Native Presence, edited by Gerald Vizenor, University of Nebraska Press, 2008, pp. 1-23. 

Whyte, Kyle. “Against Crisis Epistemology.” Routledge Handbook of Critical Indigenous

Studies, edited by Brendan Hokowhitu, Aileen Moreton-Robinson, Linda Tuhiwai-Smith, Chris Andersen, and Steve Larkin, Routledge, 2020, pp. 52-64.




Thursday, October 27, 2022

Surveillance Week


https://mediastudies.as.virginia.edu/people/profile/sv2r 

https://medialab.virginia.edu/democracyindanger 

https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520272897/the-googlization-of-everything 

https://research.monash.edu/en/persons/mark-andrejevic

https://criminologyweb.com/jeremy-bentham-panopticon/


Target and policing: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-08-25/how-target-tgt-police-surveilled-black-neighbors-in-inner-cities 

More on predictive policing: 

https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing 

https://projects.tampabay.com/projects/2020/investigations/police-pasco-sheriff-targeted/ 

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/09/technology-cant-predict-crime-it-can-only-weaponize-proximity-policing 

 

Simon Browne:   

https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/aads/faculty/sb28889 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBwz-Jag1ZE

Jacob Gaboury: https://jacobgaboury.com/ 

Zach Blas >>  http://www.zachblas.info/  (works > Facial Recognition Suite) 

    

Art and Surveillance:  

https://www.vice.com/en_us/topic/surveillance-art  (look at Trevor on counter-surveillance; 4 rows down) 

https://theintercept.com/2014/11/13/art-surveillance-explored-artists/ 

 

BRUNTON AND NISSENBAUM: 

http://finnb.net/   (UC Davis) 

https://tech.cornell.edu/people/helen-nissenbaum/ 

https://www.amazon.com/Obfuscation-Users-Guide-Privacy-Protest/dp/0262529866 

Nissenbaum helped develop:  

 https://adnauseam.io/  (watch video) 

http://trackmenot.io/ 

 

Also look at: https://allaboutdnt.com/ 

https://applymagicsauce.com/demo 

https://donottrack-doc.com/en/intro/ 



Obfuscating surveillance - Will Core post 3/5

 Within this weeks readings on surveillance, I was particularly interested in the threads on resistance, indeterminacy and obfuscation. That is, ways to subvert the extraction and domination of surveillant infrastructures. To begin with, Simone Browne details how surveillant practices are rooted in racist and colonial histories. She presents "dark sousveillance" as a way of the oppressed to 'look back' at the oppressor. Browne suggests black folk to adopt the practices of their oppressors by filming, observing and making known the violence of oppression and slavery. In doing so, sousveillance empowers the oppressed to resist gaze of the master and organise against it.

Moreover, Gaboury details how queer theory can inform database systems and practices. By tracing the affordances and potentialities of NULL markers in SQL, Gaboury highlights how the indeterminacy of NULL markers can render data subjects as opaque to surveillant infrastructures. I take Rohan's point that NULL markers fail to entirely evade surveillant infrastructures. Indeed, even with NULL markers, a record corresponding to the resistor is still created, and still exists within the database. Yet, with the "totalization of environmental surveillance" as Andrejevic (2017), perhaps obfuscation is the best that we can possibly hope for.

And with that, I turn optimistically to Nissenbaum and Bunton who provide some wonderful grounded practices for 'obfuscating' surveillance capitalist infrastructures. They explain how these practices were born out of helplessness - the inability to escape being tracked led them to consider alternative approaches for protecting privacy and retaining autonomy. I want to take this opportunity to promote two of these tools that I have been using for some time.

First, AdNauseam asks what happens if instead of ignoring ads, we click on them. Of course, ads are used as general revenue for almost every website online. Clicking on ads provides those websites that you use with income. But they also build up your data profile, allowing for you to be categorised, profiled and effectively marketed to. As Gaboury explains: "Facebook doesn’t care who you are or how you identify; it only cares that you have an identity that is addressable by Facebook." AdNauseum not only acts as an ad blocker (and often a more effective one than 'free' corporatized models e.g., AdBlockPlus). It also obscures your 'real' clicks amongst the noise of interacting with the ads that it blocks. Similarly, Track Me Not works by regularly searching random phrases across Bing and Google, to 'hide' your legitimate searches. The idea of these extensions is that the 'signal' that is your legitimate internet activity is drowned out by the noise of illegitimate activity.

Wednesday, October 26, 2022

Dalia Hatalova Blog Post # 9/15

Pairing Robert Bresson's films,  A Man Escaped (1956) and L'Argent (1983), with Theodore J. Flicker's bizarre spy/sci-fi comedy The President's Analyst (1967) may seem counterintuitive. Yet, it was the very combination of these films that struck my interest. The first of the trio, A Man Escaped, which I watched yesterday with a friend and was reflecting on in the view of the readings, presents supremely traditional government surveillance. The protagonist, a man in a Nazi camp for French soldiers arrested for terrorism, attempts to escape. The surveillance is physical in the form of guards high above (a la panopticon), and his attempts to escape are conducted through purely physical means. It is the naturalness of this world and its stationing of surveillance as a governmental and military endeavor that proves curious in view of the texts assigned for this week's class. Perhaps, it is closest to Browne's descriptions of historical racialized surveillance, but it is nevertheless far from Google and Facebook, which create an entirely different sphere of information to Bresson's depiction of communication networks besides the prison washbasins. 

Contemporary governmental surveillance structures are leached off of the industry. This assertion made by Andrejevic provides an exciting reading when looking back in time to the second of the three films, The President's Analyst. In view of this course, I definitely recommend the film, which (as the title implies) centers on a doctor assigned to be a therapist for the president. Filled with the paranoia of spies targeting him, he flees the job after some time, only to be attempted to be kidnapped by a number of spies and eliminated by the FBI, as he carries secret information. The primary entity interested in capturing him, however, is surprisingly revealed not to be a country but a corporation: the phone company. In the clip below, it is the analyst captured by the phone company who is supposed to persuade the president to allow for a phone implant into people's brains. The phone company's watching of the main characters happily reuniting at the end of the film is an ominous foreboding in this fantastical comedy of what is to come. However, more pertinently, it shows that during the time, physical espionage was seen as a governmental approach, whereas technical espionage was an industrial endeavor. Since then, the two have mixed. 



Bringing in the last film was just based on the association I made when reading the text by Andrejevic, which speaks of the way that profiles and surveillance are constructed to predict crime, reminiscent of the text on terrorism targets being determined by a combination of digital traces. When speaking of preventative tactics in the police, Andrejevic mentions a man, Robert McDaniel, who was confronted by police because of an algorithmic assertion that he would commit a crime. When doing some additional research, I came upon an article that discussed the case. With McDaniel, he was identified on a heat list, but it was that process itself that led to him being not the perpetrator but the victim of gun violence. Matt Stroud writes, "In McDaniel's view, the heat list caused the harm its creators hoped to avoid: it predicted a shooting that wouldn't have happened if it hadn't predicted the shooting" (theverge.com). With this story, my thoughts turned to L'Argent, where an innocent man is taken to prison because of unwittingly passing along a forged banknote, only to eventually be led to violent crime. While identifying someone who is innocent might appear to need no more than a shrug of the shoulders, the consequences of misincarceration or mistargeting should be questioned. The intermingling of circumstances makes the individual an impossible science, as Barthes writes. While potentiality for crime exists in everyone, potential does not come into being on its own.

Max Berwald – Core Post #3

“What would a queer technics look like? One that is explicitly situated within the logic of information systems but refuses this gesture of capture and extraction?" (Gaboury 2018, 145)

Credit has to be given to Gaboury for presenting the problem of how to become illegible in a way that more or less recognizes its difficulty, persistence, intransigence. Thinking inside of SQL in this way is also a creative move. However, codifying oneself as NULL within a coercive, surveillant informational system remains at best a paradox. This seems like a different kind of issue than that presented by Keeling’s “Queer OS.” Whereas the idea of the queer OS was formulated most provocatively as broken and glitched (and therefore incapable of being effectively instrumentalized by power) the NULL marker seems to be a way of rendering oneself fully legible (NULL is a valid marker within SQL that SQL is unambiguously capable of interpreting). Within power, incorporating the agency of those who would “make use” of SQL (those who query the database), NULL markers may present as a problem to be solved, but they are still eminently legible. It is easier to imagine that the agencies querying a database in surveillant ways will simply ask a slightly different question than to imagine that NULL markers will “infect” so many database operations as to render it instrumentally useless. I don’t see NULL as being in the “middle” between outside and inside surveillant informational systems. Rather, the NULL marker is a way of accounting for the interstitial terrain between “inside and outside” in a way marginally more effective than, say, the binary model of a value having or lacking an equivalent value. The gap between this digital way of knowing and the infinite plurality of the world surveillant information systems seek to control is vast, and NULL is not in this “excluded middle.” 


“I am suggesting that the NULL marker corresponds with the epistemological condition of queerness as an excessive illegibility collapsed into an unwieldy frame, an aberrant thirdness…” (Gaboury 2018, 153) [Emphasis mine.]


However, this not to say that I think there is no tactical utility to resisting surveillant systems of knowing: I can see how it is far better to populate a database with NULLS than to populate a database with data that is somehow richer, or that facilitates more vigorous forms of exploitation and oppression. It is only to say that we should avoid at all costs conflating (1) failing to appear before or be recorded by surveillant systems and (2) appearing as “an aberrant third”  within those surveillant systems. To put this in the language of Siva, “meaningful freedom implies real control over the conditions of one’s life” rather than the freedom of the menu (2011, 89), the ability to appear aberrantly within a surveillant infrastructure. The ubiquity of SQL is, no matter how intransigent, still the problem that demands to be grappled with. 


This comes out, I think, in both the Browne and the Andrejevic. When Andrejevic writes about the “becoming environmental” of surveillance (2017, 887–8) it is difficult not to think of LAPD’s own now-defunct LASER program. (The program is defunct although of course LAPD’s experimentation and implementation of predictive policing technologies continues.) LASER of course preemptively sought “problem” individuals, but it also sought to identify “crime hotspots”: neighborhoods, all the way down to individual blocks, where police resources should be concentrated. Surveillance intensifying surveillance. These neighborhoods and blocks were, of course, often those historically marginalized, or even produced by, racist policies, calling to mind the historically raced quality of contemporary surveillance Browne describes. The examples of historical sousveillance given by Browne (such as the tripping of the horses of slave patrols or the production of false papers) (2015, 21–2) offer a useful way of thinking into the middle space between the world and recorded, instrumental knowledge about the world, to think about what contesting surveillance might look like. But, as I think all these authors would agree, there is something very different about the surveillant quality of relational database management systems and older analogs that relied on, say, a patrol, and part of the problem is the very “softness” of the power Gaboury describes: the ever increasing distance between the surveyor and the surveilled. 

Dalia Hatalova Core Post #2/5 Blog Post #8/15

 With this week's texts, I found myself reflecting on the transference of surveillance as a system from the governmental to the industrial and back to the governmental, as well as the way that surveillance privileges the visual as a form of knowledge. As examples for the direction of my thoughts, I want to use a couple of Robert Bresson's films,  A Man Escaped (1956) and L'Argent (1983), as well as Theodore J. Flicker's comedy The President's Analyst (1967). Collectively, these films are interesting to me by representing different relationships with surveillance, from purely governmental and militant monitoring to a greater imbrication of the industrial and governmental. (I will include these films in a separate later post, though, to keep the length of the core post concise and maintain focus on the texts.) Here, I follow the trajectories, particularly of Mark Andrejevic's and Siva Vaidhyanathan's respective texts, in view of these topics. 


All of the four texts for the week reference Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish. Simone Browne connects Foucault's idea of the panopticon to the surveillance in dialogue with slave ships (Browne 24); meanwhile, for Andrejevic, the panopticon is an essential feature for differentiating between disciplinary surveillance that rests on panoptic modes in contrast to predictive modes built on environmental surveillance. Andrejevic describes that "if the disciplinary goal is the spectacle of surveillance, the preemptive one is its disappearance through ubiquity" (Andrejevic 890). Both authors highlight that, through Foucault's model, one can see the implications of power imbalances on structural levels; these can include governmental infrastructures ranging from slave ships to airports that are allowed to function in ways that are officially sanctioned in the former to prison complexes and policing in the latter text. What Andrejevic's work further points to, however, is an interesting power balance between the governmental and the industrial. He writes, "Advances in media technology and practice often migrate from the realms of warfare and security to that of the market, but in the case of predictive policing, the direction has been reversed" (887); on the next page, Andrejevic continues "security agencies have found ways to piggyback on the data collection practices of major players in the tech sector, including Google, Microsoft, and Facebook" (888). Here Andrejevic's text comes into direct relation to what Vaidhyanathan describes on the topic of data collection by platforms. For Vaidhyanathan, the idea of the panopticon is no longer as relevant because, as she describes, "mass surveillance does not inhibit behavior: people may act weird regardless of the number of cameras pointed at them" but also, more importantly, because the new digital forms of surveillance "involve not the subjection of the individual to the gaze of a single, centralized authority, but the surveillance of the individual, potentially by all, always by many" (Vaidhyanathan 112). Despite these changes, as Vaidhyanathan points out in another section, "Mass surveillance has been a fact of life since the eighteenth century. There is nothing new about the bureaucratic imperative to record and manipulate data on citizens and consumers. Digital tools just make it easier to collect, merge, and sell databases" (97). 


In thinking about the similarities between the forms of past and present surveillance, I was struck by the nature of the information being captured, as the vast majority of it pertains to the visual sense. In order for the predictive forms of surveillance that Andrejevic describes to work, data needs to be as complete as possible - to include as many dots as possible to connect. Yet, dots seem to, in most cases, remain dots: visual elements that remain but one part of the information spectrum available to humans. The phone in itself is primarily interacted with in two ways, the visual and the sonic, but as a result, it can only record and deliver these two forms of information. Yet, if a person meets another who smells of heavy perfume or who feels sweaty upon a handshake, a vastly different range of information becomes available, which a phone cannot glean. Some technical parts inhabit these forms of surveillance that lie beyond human senses, as when Browne describes "the fingerprint data template technology and retina scans where the human body, or parts and pieces of it, are digitized for automation, identification and verification purposes" (Browne 26). However, this biometric reduction of flesh to information, as Browne describes it, does not negate the way that slaves were monitored by being made to use lamps in the streets as a way of enabling surveillance through the visible. For Andrejevic, these data points can include past actions that are not necessarily connected to particular senses but more to preexistent governmental interactions (previous offenses, phone calls, etc.), but he likewise speaks of attempts to monitor biometric data, including "body temperature, facial expression, pulse rate, and other signals" (Andrejevitc 891). As these different data points mingle, the different sensory implications need to be examined in order to understand not only the ways in which surveillance is utilized by how it reads (and is able to read) the world it observes. Beyond the human, though, Vilem Flusser's writing on technical images in Towards a philosophy of photography also provides a possible ground for examining, on the other hand, the way that technical sensing can monitor - and consequently, visualize - information that is not readily viewable to people's sensory mechanism. 

Pratik Core Post #3

 

The concept of agency and autonomy is something we should discuss more, especially in relation to surveillance and how much choice we have in giving up our data. Often times around discourses of surveillance, there is a belief that we can just simply not engage with a product or service to circumvent our data being extracted. Additionally, even those that are aware that their personal data is being harvested in the most intimate and private ways often believe that they have nothing to hide, therefore they are somehow immune to the harms of these practices. This third-person effect phenomenon fails to understand the social, political, and cultural contexts in which a lot of these technological mechanisms exist. For example, it is essentially impossible to exist without having certain social media profiles. Even those who might argue this point, have a LinkedIn account boasting of their academic and professional accomplishments because they want to look suitable to the employers' gaze. Vaidyanathan's chapter alludes to the "tradeoffs" between privacy and convenience, which is such a fascinating space of contention. Ultimately, It is extremely difficult for people to give up access, ease, and utility, and these companies are well aware of that and capitalizing off of it. 

I am always a big fan of reading Andrejevic, his texts always push me to think deeper and differently about surveillance and this piece did just that. In this piece where he dives into surveillance as a use to "predict" and "prevent" acts of violence, we are reminded of the violent interventions that go hand in hand with the phenomenon of predictive policing. The process that is designed to negate violence is thus equally if not more violent. Another really fascinating paradox pointed out was how preemptive practices are framed around discourses of doing nothing, implying that not authorizing a drone strike would be the equivalent of complacency. A similar logic is used by law enforcement when they are not sure if someone is armed or not, there is an assumption that the default is a threat unless proven otherwise. Andrejevic says it well, "This is not about prevention in the sense of transforming the conditions that contribute to theft or fighting; it is about being in the right place to stop an imminent act before it takes place. " (p. 883).


Browne pushes us to think about how race is constructed and reconstructed when it comes to surveillance and violence. Resisting against scholars who may imply "surveillance as something inaugurated by new technologies," Browne believes that surveillance is and has been ongoing and that is imperative to how "racism and antiblackness undergird and sustain the intersecting surveillances of our present order" (p. 8).

In the introduction of the book, Browne cites an example of racializing surveillance in a simple yet extraordinary way. “Street behaviors of white men (standing still and talking, using a cellular phone, passing an unseen object from one to another) may be coded as normal and thus granted no attention, whereas the same activity performed by Black men will be coded as lying on or beyond the boundary of the normal, and thus subject to disciplinary action. Where public spaces are shaped for and by whiteness, some acts in public are abnormalized by way of racializing surveillance and then coded for disciplinary measures that are punitive in their effects. " (p. 17). This forces us to also think about who are the publics and who defines and dictates acceptable behaviors in public spaces.

In terms of platforms, Gaboury emphasizes the point that the data we give to companies is extremely valuable for them. I like the term, "Compulsory Identification" used in the text. While gender is a significant form of expression to many, it is also a construct that many may not feel aligns with themselves or part of who they are. Nonetheless, Google, Facebook, etc. need a way to measure you, categorize you, and repackage your advertising preferences and behaviors so that you are an ideal consumer subject. The politics of gender are significant, but to platforms, wouldn't gender, age, race, geography, and language, all be simply a data point for targeting and nothing more? As Gaboury references, previous literature has marked queerness as value-less, and undesirable under capitalism, but one could argue now that advertisers could potentially thrive off data points regarding the resistance to hegemonic forms heteronormativity and masculinity as extremely valuable. Gaboury suitably remarkes, "Queerness here is marked by its illegibility to the social order; indeed this is its very value."




[Hamsini - Core Post 2] Resisting Surveillance

 

Hito Steyerl, How Not to Be Seen (2013)

Is surveillance ever actually total? Many of the readings this week, even as they lay out the systems of surveillance—by states, companies, each other, ourselves—that mark a shift from panoptic modes to Deleuzian “societies of control,” offer figures of possibility: for resistance, for escape, for, at any rate, rendering surveillance incomplete.

Browne gives us “dark sousveillance”: “an imaginative place from which to mobilize a critique of racializing surveillance, a critique that takes form in antisurveillance, countersurveillance, and other freedom practices. Dark sousveillance, then, plots imaginaries that are oppositional and that are hopeful for another way of being” (p. 21). It is a form of watching from the position of the slave, observing authority and the strictures of plantation life in order to mount resistance and craft escape. Even as racializing surveillance—operating through the record-keeping, legal, and policing mechanisms of slavery through to today’s high-tech facial recognition and predictive policing systems—enacts violence on Black people, there is still the possibility of otherwise. The sousveillant position opens up the possibility for physical fugitivity, but also for creative, artistic, spiritual critique and escape as well.

Meanwhile, Gaboury operates from the perspective of queer theory to examine possibilities for refusal of totalizing computational systems. To Gaboury, there is no outside; queerness offers the possibility not of escaping surveillance but of becoming illegible within its confines. This a story of refusal, opacity, indeterminacy in face of surveillance, which he renders concrete through a discussion of NULL values in SQL, arguing that NULL-ness “corresponds with the epistemological condition of queerness as an excessive illegibility collapsed into an unwieldy frame, an aberrant third-ness within an otherwise normative system of relations.” As Rohan points out in his post, NULL does not escape the database; nor does it destroy it. But it exists within the system as a negation of value (an absent presence, perhaps, vs. the present absence of the Black feminist perspective Browne centers). To Gaboury, in this context, escape is a utopian imaginary that contrasts with the real possibility of defying the logics of categorization.

Vaidhyanathan, meanwhile, is concerned with pushing back on the individualizing (dividualizing?) logics of Google by pointing to the ways in which it is collectivity, our social relations, that constitute desirable data—and it is through collective mechanisms of protest and rebellion (as well as law) that people can push back. To Vaidhyanathan, it is important for people to understand the ways in which Google and other tech companies control the terms of how information is managed through “infrastructural imperialism” rather than defining particular categories of information (such as race, gender, etc.)—but local, culturally specific ways of seeing can challenge such universalizing terms. Of course, his chapter also documents the ways in which such resistance is co-opted: how groups protesting Google Street View, for example, come to be accommodated, and the controversy itself draws attention to and markets the tool.

Andrejevic does not explicitly discuss resistance, focusing on describing the shift from disciplinary power and panopticon to environmental surveillance that escapes citizen awareness and indeed forecloses politics. However, the tension between surveillance and resistance to surveillance is still visible here: the figure of the terrorist and the criminal, for instance, defies disciplinary power in surveillance by being “inexplicable,” “intransigent,” “nonnarrativizable,”—in a word, an irrational rather than rational subject. To try to catch these thieves necessitates preemption rather than deterrence, the development of new, actuarial mechanisms of surveillance (though Browne’s history of surveillance, perhaps, challenges how “new” such modes are). However, I would suggest it is possible that even totalizing systems of preemption can and do fail, and perhaps there is possibility in that failure: Andrejevic references Minority Report in his discussion of predictive policing (a novella and film of the same genre as Handmaid’s Tale: what if modes of oppression historically applied to Black and other marginalized peoples were applied to white people?). But, of course, the predictive policing of Minority Report is stymied by the actual minority report—the errors in prediction that suggest the possibility of alternative futures.

I’ll wrap up by pointing to two pieces that kept coming to mind on modalities of resisting surveillance as I read this week: Lauren Bridges’ article on “Digital failure: Unbecoming the “good” data subject through entropic, fugitive, and queer data,” and Hito Steyerl’s How Not to Be Seen.